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Appellant, Frank K. Gilroy, through his attorneys, Callister Nebeker & 
McCullough and Charles M. Bennett, files this Brief in Support of his Appeal. 
JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Audrey Lynne Athay Dow ("Ms. Dow"), filed this 
lawsuit seeking a declaration that she is the daughter of the Defendant/Appellant, 
Frank K. Gilroy ("Mr. Gilroy"). Petition for Paternity ("Petition") f 5, R. at 3. 
Mr. Gilroy filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking permission to file an 
interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted that petition and poured the case 
over to the Court of Appeals. R. at 67. In ruling on Ms. Dow's motion to 
compel Mr. Gilroy to submit to genetic testing, the Court of Appeals noted that 
it had jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1994) and 
granted the petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal nunc pro tunc. 
See Order of the Utah Court of Appeals dated May 10, 1995. Accordingly, the 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of Mr. Gilroy's appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue for review is: Does Utah Code § 78-12-25(3) (four year statute 
of limitations for "[a]n action not otherwise provided by law") apply to an action 
to determine a child's paternity filed over 50 years after the birth of that child and 
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over 25 years after the child's mother advised the child of the identity of the 
putative father? 
Mr. Gilroy filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of that Ms. Dow filed her 
action more than 4 years after the cause of action arose. The trial court denied 
Mr. Gilroy's motion. As stated above, Mr. Gilroy sought an interlocutory appeal 
which was granted. 
A trial court's application of a statute of limitations is a question of law that 
the Court of Appeal reviews for "correctness." St. Benedict's Development Co. 
v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY CITATION 
The application of Section 78-12-1 and Section 78-12-25 of the Utah Code 
is determinative of this appeal. Those sections provides: 
78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed 
in this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific 
cases where a different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ms. Dow filed her Petition against Mr. Gilroy seeking a declaration that he 
was her father. Petition f 5, R. at 3. Mr. Gilroy moved to dismiss on the basis 
of the statute of limitations. R. at 19-20. The trial court denied Mr. Gilroy's 
motion. R. at 63-64. He then petitioned for permission to file an interlocutory 
appeal, and that petition was granted. R. at 67; Order of the Utah Court of 
Appeals dated May 10, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although Mr. Gilroy denies the allegation that he is the plaintiffs father, 
for purposes of his Motion to Dismiss and this Interlocutory Appeal, he assumes 
the truth of all of the allegations in Ms. Dow's Petition. St. Benedict's 
Development Co., 811 P.2d at 196. Accordingly: 
1. Ms. Dow was born on October 5, 1943. Petition f 6; R. at 3. She 
is now 51 years old. 
2. Ms. Dow's mother told plaintiff that plaintiffs father was Mr. 
Gilroy. Petition f 8; R. at 4. 
3. Ms. Dow's mother died on October 2, 1969. Petition 1 8; R. at 4. 
Thus, Ms. Dow has known of the underlying factual allegations since October 2, 
1969. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because Ms. Dow filed her Petition over twenty (20) years after the running 
of the "catch-all" statute of limitations in Section 78-12-25(3), her Petition is 
barred by that statute. Accordingly, the District Court should have granted Mr. 
Gilroy's Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the petition with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ABSENT A DISABILITY THAT TOLLS THE STATUTE, A 
PATERNITY ACTION MUST BE BROUGHT WITHIN FOUR YEARS 
OF THE DATE THE ACTION ARISES. 
A. Utah's Statutory Provisions Establish a Four Year Statute of 
Limitations for Paternity Actions. 
The Uniform Act on Paternity (the "Paternity Act") grants a mother, 
child or applicable public authority the power to seek a legal declaration of 
paternity. Utah Code § 78-45a-2 (1994). Like most Utah laws, the Paternity 
Act has no self-contained statute of limitations for bringing an action pursuant 
to the Act. However, the Paternity Act does limit the amount that can be 
recovered from a father for the support of the child to the support obligations 
incurred during the four year period preceding the filing of the complaint. 
Utah Code § 78-45a-3 (1994). 
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Utah law provides statutory limits to when lawsuits can be filed in two 
ways. First, there are specific statute of limitations contained within individual 
acts. For example, Section 75-3-107 provides a specific three year statute of 
limitations from the date of a decedent's death in which a petition from probate 
of a will can be filed in a probate proceeding. Utah Code § 75-3-107 (1994). 
Second, when the specific provisions of Utah law are silent, the general statutes 
of limitations apply. Utah Code § 78-12-1 et seq. (1994). 
Section 78-12-1 provides the general rule regarding the application of 
limitations periods as follows: 
78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except 
in specific cases where a different limitation is prescribed by statute. 
Thus, since no civil action may be commenced outside of the time periods 
provided in a specific statute of limitations or the general statute of limitations, 
every cause of action in Utah has a statute of limitations. 
Section 78-12-25(3) further supports this conclusion. It provides: 
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78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
In its most recent decision, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 78-12-
25(3) in precisely this way. American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 
P.2d 757 (Utah 1992). In American Tierra, the defendant argued that the six 
month statute of limitations in Section 78-12-31 barred the plaintiffs claim; the 
plaintiff argued that the four year period in Section 78-12-25(3) applied. In 
reaching its conclusion that Section 78-12-25(3) applied, the Court cited a 
number of its prior decisions concerning Section 78-12-25(3) and repeatedly 
referred to that statute of limitations as the "catch-all" statute. American 
Tierra, 840 P.2d at 760-61. The Court noted: "Before applying the catch-all 
statute to this case, however, we must satisfy ourselves that Utah's current 
statutes of limitations do not contain a more specific provision." American 
Tierra, 840 P.2d at 760. Thus, absent a more specific statutory period of 
limitations for paternity actions, the "catch-all" provision of Section 78-12-25(3) 
applies. There is no such thing as a Utah cause of action without a statute of 
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limitations. Therefore, an action for paternity, like any other cause of action in 
Utah, has a statute of limitations. 
B. Utah Case Law Confirms that there is a Statute of Limitations 
for Paternity Actions, subject to Tolling during the Period a 
Claimant is Legally Disabled. 
In 1976, the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's dismissal of a 
paternity action on the basis of the eight year statute of limitations found in 
Section 78-12-22 ("an action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for 
failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent children"). Martinez v. 
Romero, 558 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah 1976). However, the very next year, in 
Nielsen, State Dept. o/S.S. v. Hansen, the Utah Supreme Court re-examined 
the issue of whether the eight year statute of limitations under Section 78-12-22 
precluded a lawsuit against the father to determine paternity and to collect 4 
months of child support obligations. Nielsen, State Dept. ofS.S. v. Hansen, 
564 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1977). In reversing the trial court's dismissal on the basis 
of the statute of limitations in Section 78-12-22, the Court stated in dicta: 
We are unable to find any time limitation as to when 
a suit may be instituted to determine paternity. The 
child has an interest in the matter and courts should 
be reluctant to invent limitations not set out in the 
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statute, especially where minor children may be 
adversely affected thereby. 
Nielsen, 564 P.2d at 1114. Since both Utah Code § 78-12-1 and Section 78-12-
25(3) were enacted prior to 1977, as to these statutes, this dicta is erroneous. 
See Utah Code §§ 78-12-1 et seq. (1954; as amended through 1977). 
Unfortunately, this erroneous dicta in Nielsen has created confusion and caused 
the trial court's erroneous decision in this case. R. at 76. ("I find that this 
matter is unsettled . . . . I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss at this time. 
It may very well need to go up and get clarification.") 
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to revisit the issue at bar in 1981 
in Szarak v. Sandoval. Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981). The 
Court first acknowledged that the area was far from clear: 
The question of the limitations period applicable to 
actions for paternity and child support has been a 
troubled one, complicated by multiple parties, 
overlapping statutes and contradictory opinions. 
Szarak, 636 P.2d at 1083. Although acknowledging the Court's dicta in 
Nielsen quoted above, the Court noted that Nielsen stood only for the 
proposition that the eight year statute of limitations in Section 78-12-22 did not 
apply to paternity actions. Szarak, 636 P.2d at 1084. 
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The defendant in Szarak argued that the general statute of limitations in 
Sections 78-12-1 et seq. applied. ("Civil actions can be commenced only 
within the period prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action accrues." 
Utah Code § 78-12-1 (1994)). Further, the defendant argued that either the 
three year period of Section 78-12-26(3) ("a liability created by the statutes of 
the state")1 or the four year period of Section 78-12-25(3) (fl[a]n action for 
relief not otherwise provided by law") applied to preclude that action. Szarak, 
636 P.2d at 1084. 
The Court did not reject the defendant's analysis. It did, however, reject 
the defendant's position by holding that whatever statute of limitations applied, 
it was tolled during the child's minority. Id. at 1084-85. Utah Code § 78-12-
36 (1994) (statute of limitations are tolled during the time a person who has a 
claim is legally disabled). Since the child in Szarak was still a minor, that 
ruling resolved the case. 
Although the Court did not rule on the issue presented in this case, it did 
indicate how it would have ruled absent the tolling provision. "While the 
1
 In Szarak, the plaintiff was seeking support payments. Thus, the defendant argued that Section 
78-12-26(3) applied to bar the plaintiffs claim. Since there is no claim for support in the present case, 
the applicable statute of limitations is the four year "catch-air statute. Utah Code § 78-12-25(3) 
(1994). 
9 
child's action to establish paternity and enforce child support is not barred by 
the statute of limitations until after the child attains majority, the amount of 
recovery of child support is still limited by [the four year period in] Section 78-
45a-3." Id. at 1084-85 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court ruled: 
"Consequently, we hold that any statute limiting the time within which a 
paternity action must be commenced under the Uniform Act on Paternity is 
tolled for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during the period of the child's 
minority." Accordingly, the Court properly noted that, like all causes of action 
in Utah, there is a statute of limitations for paternity actions once a child 
reaches majority, although the Court declined to determine what statute applied. 
The ruling in Szarak is important because it answered the concern that 
prompted the erroneous dicta in Nielsen. In Nielsen, the Court noted: "The 
child has an interest in the matter and courts should be reluctant to invent 
limitations not set out in the statute, especially where minor children may be 
adversely affected thereby." Nielsen, 564 P.2d at 1114. Under the Szarak 
Court's holding (minority tolls the statute of limitations as to minors), the 
Nielsen Court's concern is met. Szarak, 636 P.2d at 1084. Thus, there is no 
need to ignore Utah law. Sections 78-12-1 and 78-12-25(3) establish a "catch-
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all" provision that guarantees there will be a statute of limitations for every 
cause of action in Utah. 
C. Application to Ms. Dow's Claim in this Case. 
In the present case, Ms. Dow reached the ages of 18 and 21 in 1961 and 
1964 respectively. Petition f 6, R. at 3. She learned the allegation that Mr. 
Gilroy was her father from her mother and that occurred no later than October 
2, 1969 (the date of her mother's death). Petition f 8, R. at 4. In 1994, she 
filed her Petition asking the District Court to rule that Mr. Gilroy is her father. 
R. at 2. Since Ms. Dow filed her lawsuit over 20 years after the running of the 
"catch-all" statute of limitations of Section 78-12-25(3), the trial court should 
have dismissed her claim with prejudice.2 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Mr. Gilroy asks the Court of Appeals to reverse the 
trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss and remand for an entry of an order 
dismissing Ms. Dow's Petition with prejudice. 
2
 In cases where support is sought, the three year statute of limitation in Section 78-12-26(3) would 
apply. Utah Code § 78-12-26(3) (1994). If the statute were tolled because of a legal disability, the 
claimant would still be limited to support payments for the four years preceding the filing of the action. 
Szarak, 636 P.2d at 1084-85. 
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Dated June/V, 1995. 
& 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
Charles M. Benneftt 
Attorneys for Appellant, Frank K. Gilroy 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed, postage prepaid, on this /y day of 
June, 1995 to the following: 
Phillip Kent Card 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
960 West 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119-1530 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Petition for Paternity 
2. Order (Denying Motion to Dismiss) 
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PHILLIP KENT CARD (Bar #5261) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
960 West 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119-1530 
Telephone (801) 973-0091 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AUDREY LYNNE ATHAY DOW, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs . 
FRANK KENNETH GILROY, 
Defendant. 
PETITION FOR 
PATERNITY 
Civil No. WfifOWW P* 
J u d g3UDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45a-l, fit 
seq. . the Pla int i f f by and through her counsel of record, Phi l l ip 
Kent Card, hereby pleads as follows: 
ti .This i s a paternity action instigated under Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-45a-l , «»t seq. 
2. This court has jurisdiction over the Defendant, Frank 
Kenneth Gilroy (the "alleged father"), because he i s e i ther a 
- l -
resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, or he submitted 
himself to the jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-27-24(7), by engaging in sexual intercourse 
within the State of Utah which has given rise to this paternity 
action. 
3. Venue is appropriate in this Court under Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-45a-14, because the Plaintiff, Frank Kenneth 
Gilroy, is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. The Plaintiff, Audrey Lynne Athay Dow, currently 
resides in and is a resident of Teaneck, New Jersey, 
5. Upon information and belief, Defendant Frank Kenneth 
Gilroy is the father of the Plaintiff. This allegation is 
supported by the Affidavit of the Plaintiff, attached to this 
Complaint as Exhibit lfA,f . 
6. The Plaintiff was born on the 5th day of October, 
1943, at Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, and was born 
to her mother. 
7. Throughout Plaintiff's life, the Defendant made 
regular contact with the Plaintiff and continues to be in contact 
with the Plaintiff. 
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8. Plaintiff's mother, now deceased, informed the 
Plaintiff that Defendant Frank Kenneth Gilroy is Plaintiff's 
father. The date of Plaintiff's mother's death was the 2nd day of 
October, 1969. 
9. Genetic testing should be ordered for all individuals 
concerned and the Defendant should be required to pay for the costs 
of such genetic testing and compensation of any expert witnesses to 
determine Defendant's paternity. 
10. If this matter is uncontested, each party should be 
ordered to pay their own attorneys1 fees and Court costs. If 
contested, Defendant should be responsible for his attorney fees 
and Court costs and Plaintiff's reasonable attorney fees and Court 
costs. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief: 
1. For a determination and Decree of paternity that 
Defendant Frank Kenneth Gilroy is the father of the Plaintiff 
Audrey Lynne Athay Dow. 
2. Judgment be entered in favor of the Plaintiff against 
the Defendant for costs incurred by the Plaintiff herein, including 
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but not limited to genetic testing costs and compensation of expert 
witnesses. 
3 . For an order requiring each party to pay their own 
attorneys' fees and Court costs if uncontested. If contested, for 
an order requiring the Plaintiff to pay his attorney fees and Court 
costs and to pay Plaintiff's reasonable attorney fees and Court 
costs. 
4. The Plaintiff be awarded such other relief as the 
Court deems proper. 
DATED this /^/ day of July, 1994 
PHILLIP KENT CARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address: 
5 84 Cumberland Avenue 
Teaneck, New Jersey 07666 
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PHILLIP KENT CARD (Bar #5261) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
960 West 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119-1530 
Telephone (801) 973-0091 
II I Ml' I H ^ T P T i ' l 1 i-DURT n r TT1H TTITRI'i i l U n r C T A f , nTT.TRTCT 
I N AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AirppRY T.-rTJTIK ATUAY l"n -W, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
FRANK KENNETH GILROY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
RULE 4-501 RULING 11/21/94 
Civil No. 940904441 PA 
Judge GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Tl: le Defendai itl|" s I Ic: »t::i • ::: i :i t: ::: D i s i i i i s s 1 :i a < ::i n g ::7 :::)i n e • ::  i :i fc: r 
hearing before the above - en t i t l ed Court c > 11:  the 21st day of 
November 19°4 -»*- ••he hour of 1 1:00 a,in The Honorable J udge 
Gl en i I I :: ^ • *\ "' f LL waa iiuL present uac was 
represented bv coun . ;;• rer; Card " ' - Defender1 "~ 7 
not present out was repress:...- .. :-.. -
Based upon argument ui counsel, ful l review u*. w**w 
pleadings .on f i l e , in;! good cause appearing, the Court orders as 
t J * *OWS: 
,,,W* "•••'•"MjWI' 
fOBf-21994 
3^^U 
OapuV-
1. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
DATED this 
SNN K. IWASAKI 
7STRICT COURT JUDGE 
, 1994 
Approved as to Form: 
CHARLES M. BENNETT 
Attorney for Defendant 
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C E R T I F I C A T E Q F M I L I M G 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day at November, 1994, 
I i t tailed a true and correct copy ol the foregoing ORDER, postage 
pre-paid,, to the following: 
".LISTER, NL~ — —. -
Kennecott Buildm^ 
Salt Lake Citv Utah 84133 
M m * 
s *. ',* y 4 
Phillip Kent Card 
